[D-G] Close reading : Bergson's conception of difference [2 paragraph]
filip
fildh at gmx.net
Mon Oct 6 13:15:48 PDT 2008
Essentially, Bergson criticizes his predecessors for not having seen
true differences
of nature. The constant presence of this critique also signals the
importance of
the theme in Bergson's work: where there were differences of nature,
others have
found merely differences of degree. And certainly we find the opposite
criticism:
where there were only differences of degree, others have introduced
differences
of nature, for example, between the so-called perceptive faculty of the
brain and
the reflexive functions of the medulla, or the perception of matter and
matter
differences of nature between things of the same kind. If differences of
nature do
exist between individuals of the same kind, we must then recognize that
differ
ence itself is not simply spatio-temporal, that it is not generic or
specific—in a
word, difference is not exterior or superior to the thing. This is why,
according
to Bergson, it is important to show that general ideas, at least most of
the time,
ptesent us with extremely different facts in a grouping that is merely
utilitarian:
"Suppose on examining those states grouped under the name of pleasure,
we dis
cover they share nothing in common, except being states that a person
seeks out:
humanity will have classified very different things as the same in kind,
simply
because humanity attributed the same practical interest to each and
acted in the
same way towards them."' In this sense, differences of nature are
already the key:
we must start from them, but first we must find them. Without prejudging the
nature of difference as internal difference, we already know that
internal differ
ence exists, given that there exist differences of nature between things
of the same
genus. Therefore, either philosophy proposes for itself this means
(differences of
nature) and this end (to arrive at internal difference), or else it will
have merely
a negative or generic relation to things and will end up a part of
criticism and
mere generalities—in any case, it will run the risk of ending up in a
merely exter
nal state of reflection. Opting for the first alternative, Bergson puts
forward
philosophy's ideal: to tailor "for the object a concept appropriate to
that object
alone, a concept that one can hardly still call a concept, since it
applies only to
that one thing." This unity of the thing and the concept is internal
differnce, which
one reaches thorugh differences of nature.
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