[D-G] Concepts seen as functions (malgosia askanas)

[Harald Wenk]

Dear Group,

In the discussion in "what is philosophy",
in the german edition on page 39,
on philosophical concepts and their difference
to scientfic ones, which are
near functions,
the theory of salomon maimon
regarding Kant from
"difference and repetition" ist taken up.

This is remarkable as Kant himself
declared Maimon as the only one
who had fully understood him,
especially as a critique and a
dissociation from Fichte.

It is also remarkable for our discussion,
as Maimon is
taken as a philosopher,metaphysician,
of mathematics
by Deleuze,
namley of the differential (calculus) (Chapter, section there).

So he made like the others mentioned there,
Wronksi and Leibniz,
a  Philosophical notion
of "the diffrerential",
not only a mathematical one.

The latter,
a pure mamthemtical notion
of the differential,
with a "finitist" setting,
set theory and arithmetic,
is teached nowadays in academic mathematics.

Therfore he discusse somewhat lenghtl the "inifint velocity"
after page 39, of Spinoza,
knowing that mathematics nowadys "lives" from it
sophistcatd treatment of the infinite.

But mathamtcal functions are not all laguage,one,as me, my argue,
and even somewhat "older".



I think Delueze tahought right,
that contrary to the usual
classification
of phsilophy as a middle
stat of affairs
between mythology
and science,
ala at lesast imporatnt notions
are created  as real "events",
like historical events,
by the philophers
or philosophical working scientist.

So, the intellectaulas are "living"
from the philosophy in their
thinking,
so to speak.
The rest of amnkind too,
as thinking of amnistheability to
form notions, including crating them,
according to Spinoza.

This is a improvemnet
ofAlthussers "tehreoticalpractice"
and an uptaking of Spinozas
apparsal,
that mankind bengefits most of the use of its intellect,


To sum up,
if science takes a notion,
is has alreadyundergone philosophcal creating or
as event or
is derived from it.

The discussion on logic, especailly
matahmatcial ligiuc is on the
same line,
as he remarks, that in set theory,
the self-setting of sets,
every notion has a self-setting (objectivity somehow),
is lacking.
Sets were originally taken as notions
by Frege, conencting them to the foundations
of arithemtic, and thereby to the finitistic
foundation of the "differential" and infinite.

Additional to the overview,
notions have an existential creating of subjectivity
and world property,
their philosophical "constructive"
character.


As everyone knows,
constructivism is often blamed
as being "idealstic".


Therefore the  sharp dissocation from Kant and  Hegel,
but appraisal of Fichte for

coming as fast as possible to "real" things like Spinoza at the
end  of "what is philosophy".

That is a "non idealsitc" reading of Fichte.


I think it is really good,
what Deleuz has made there.


greetings
Harald