[D-G] internal, external teleology, immanence, transcendence

[Harald Wenk]

Dear Filip,


would you please so kind and renew the link
to the Hardt book, because of some
sabatoge with  two compurters, where
I had loaded it down already,
I have actual no copy.


The idea of scholastic discussion as replacing difference
to causality can be thought  deeper
regarding the platonic forms, which are different
from eternity and gave the "formal cause"
and played a big role in the "teleological l" of final cause.

The effective cause. with the causa sui is what Spinoza made out of
the four causes scheme of Arsitotle,
and is roughly that, what we understand nowadays in
everday languge by "cause".

As every cause makes a difference bewteen cause and effect, it is
a "difference".
Keeping that difference character, the formal cause and final cause
can be  handeled as differences, stripping them of their narrower 
"causal" character.
Instead, the forms as final differences have to
have a  mechansim to be a effective causes to.

I already told you about the work of the mathematician Rene Thom,
who wrote a book on morphogenesis, that is
the
causing of forms (direct  translation from this greek title)
in nature.
This means forms like the pads on the skin of a leopard or flower 
forms and so on.

A famous example is the form of a soap bubble as
a  sphere, which is caused by the
difference of the inner pressure by the breath of the bubble maker
and the normal atmosphere pressure by molecular stress
of the soap film molecules, which have a waterphil and a waterphobe side,
producing these  molecular stress forces.
These forces give rise to a differential equation,
namely the H-surfaces equation.
The stress forces and the difference of inner and outer pressure
give forms, which are governed by this H-surfaces differential equation.
So we have an effective caus of the form "coded in
a differntial equation," which is won out of a variational problem.
The special case of equal pressure gives minimal surfaces on which i worked.
The mathematical Theory of H-surfaces is contained in a book of Finn.

The older "formal"casue scheme would be a kind of "realisation" or
copy of the eternal sphere form in a soap film
material.
Given the inner and outer pressure under the same conditions, you 
will get the same form.
That is some kind of "eternity" too, that of "natural laws".

The case of the form of the satute by sculptor is much more complex.
Some forms  are not very eternal (little joke).
It is "handeld" in asthtetics. It is a wide field, therefore I drop it here.

So, Hardts idea makes also possible, to differentiate the platonic or 
neoplatonic
stream of scholastic discussion with the aristotelian one, which
intrraction is much more in detail, than
gross directions of authors. It is a "big"  struggle in scholastic theology.

In a way,  another great scission in philosophy of empirism contra rationalism
is overcome by Deleuze with his "transcendental empirism" and
books on Hume and Spinoza as the most prominent
"notion persons" of these directions.

Concernig Kant and Spinoza, it is
proverb, the Kant reduces
Ontology to theory of knowledge.
Further he is reducing almost psychology
to sense perception and recognition, symbolism and schematism,
treating affects and feelings in a very molar, final and formal cause way.

So he has no neurology, which is present in Spinoza and makes
him the philosphicl backobone of actual
neurology, for thinking neurologist,
who know, what they are doing.
This means body-mind problem solution.

The theory of the representations of ideas and their connections, 
reoccuring as "machines" or "agencements"
in D&G is much less elaborated in Kant than in Spinoza.

Spinoza took up a lot of scholastic discusssion which are left out by Kant.

Spinozas epistemolgy is selfrefelctive, which cannot be said in this
empahtic way to Kant, who presupposes a lot about his "reasons".
These pressuopposition are otften grounded in Spinoza by arguments.
THis is the rsason for the "restricted" version.

Hegel and Schelling presuppose Spinoza,
Hegel empahsizes: Spinoza or no philophy",
making clear the  more complete cahracter of Spinoza.
In spite of that, in Germany,
Hegel is treated as an almost direct successor of Kant
and Spinoza in the realms of Hegel as an erratic
prKantian, not konwing waht "Subectivation" is.
This is turning up truth to contrary in an unbearable way,
resulting in irritations even in marxist debates
on metphysical philohy and te materlistiuc
philophocal heritage.
Even Negri reproduced the
old tune of the "stiffness" of Spinozas substance.
Burt maybe he has changed his mind in the meantime through the
percetinon of the very high level discussion on
Spinoza by the Althusser school, most prominent "Notion Person"
is Balibar.



Transcedmat realism is a standard interpretation of Aristotle.
You may apply Deleuz theory of "notion persons" to Arustotle.
What we know most, i s teh systemaz´tic reading of his lecrture,
the "person" is build around this.

The original discussion on the "unmoved mover" is in Metaphysics book XII.
Essence, intellect, theos, cosmos essence are the termes to have in mind
for his (the unmoved mover) reading.


As an absolute bonbon in Spinoza, we got even a
natural dicussion ont the eternal live,
which has a lot of practical impact, which
is more a less reduced to some some sort of "hope" in Kant.



So far, hope I helped,

Greetings Harald Wenk


--------------------------------------------------
From: "filip" <fildh at gmx.net>
Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2009 12:57 AM
To: <deleuze-guattari at lists.driftline.org>
Subject: Re: [D-G] internal, external teleology, immanence, transcendence

>Hello Harald,
>
>thank you so much  for your reply.
>
>sorry for the non introduction, but i didn't wanna make the question
>even larger.
>i'm still looking at deleuze, been reading a few other things. (it's
>growing on me)
>
>Well let me state again my problem
>a)this is what hardt writes: "In many respects Deleuze reads Bergsonian
>ontology as a Scholasticism in which the discourse on causality is
>replaced with a discussion of difference".
>b)his discussion about difference is also looked at as : externality of
>difference. only the efficient cause is causa sui, can be seen as
>internal difference.
>c)in his discussion it is not always clear how the externality is
>realised, he sometimes throws in elements of his discussion on
>representation, and doesn't stick to this treatment of deleuze and his
>opponents as an Scholasticism causality discourse.
>
>0)so the main question i have is : is  external difference =
>transcendence  ?
>
>
>next: if you follow hardt: he says: difference = motor of being
>i wanted to see what difference means for his opponents and what they
>see as the motor of being.
>
>so in steps (some are not threated explicitly by deleuze in his small
>papers, but are in difference and repitition, so i put them in the scheme)
>
>1)aristotles
>difference : property between things of the same genus, whereby you can
>put them in other subcategories
>motor of being : unmoved mover
>question: aristotles needs the unmoved move to give a final account of
>what is: so that makes his philosophy a philosophy of transcendence
>
>2)mechanism
>difference: difference as a closed mechanical structure : no newness is
>possible
>motor of being: since evertyhing is bounded up within a mechanical
>scheme: something must start this: could not find this.
>question :  mechanism works via a plan, so can you consider this plan as
>transcendence ?
>not a question anymore: found this on the net : mechanism is using an
>external teleology: the purpuse to be realized is not immanent in the
>thing: it is presupposed by an agent or devine:
>
>
>3)darwinsm
>difference :  difference is not evolution of species but evolution of
>life. evolution of species
>motor of being : does not give a fundamental account on it.
>question : how does darwin see the true nature of live: immannent or
>transcendent ?
>
>4)plato
>difference: not defined by hardt or deleuze: i expect that difference is
>again a difference between things, (like aritstotles)
>motor of being : the motor is teleological : the good is external to life.
>question
>
>5)hegel
>difference: difference is going to an "infinte externality": thing
>differs with all the rest.
>motor of being : teleological development of the mind ?
>question: hegel is using an interal teleology = living organisms , but
>needs an external at the end = teleological model of the whole ? is this
>true ?
>
>
>6) to answer your reply
>i made a mistake, i wrote: aristotles : him a transcendent philosopher?
>i wanted to say: a philosophy of transcendence.
>7)i'm not completely oke, with your sentence : In my eyes, Kant is to a
>high degree
>a restricted version of Spinoza with emphasis on "subjectivty". your
>explanation didn't get through, it was a bit fast.
>but i'm intrigued by the powerful sentence. please elaborate a bit, it
>looks great.
>
>ps: i'm trying to make a flowchart of some thought of deleuze. if they
>are ready i'll try to post them on this forum.
>
>thanks
>