[D-G] internal, external teleology, immanence, transcendence
fildh at gmx.net
Tue Jul 14 15:57:33 PDT 2009
thank you so much for your reply.
sorry for the non introduction, but i didn't wanna make the question
i'm still looking at deleuze, been reading a few other things. (it's
growing on me)
Well let me state again my problem
a)this is what hardt writes: "In many respects Deleuze reads Bergsonian
ontology as a Scholasticism in which the discourse on causality is
replaced with a discussion of difference".
b)his discussion about difference is also looked at as : externality of
difference. only the efficient cause is causa sui, can be seen as
c)in his discussion it is not always clear how the externality is
realised, he sometimes throws in elements of his discussion on
representation, and doesn't stick to this treatment of deleuze and his
opponents as an Scholasticism causality discourse.
0)so the main question i have is : is external difference =
next: if you follow hardt: he says: difference = motor of being
i wanted to see what difference means for his opponents and what they
see as the motor of being.
so in steps (some are not threated explicitly by deleuze in his small
papers, but are in difference and repitition, so i put them in the scheme)
difference : property between things of the same genus, whereby you can
put them in other subcategories
motor of being : unmoved mover
question: aristotles needs the unmoved move to give a final account of
what is: so that makes his philosophy a philosophy of transcendence
difference: difference as a closed mechanical structure : no newness is
motor of being: since evertyhing is bounded up within a mechanical
scheme: something must start this: could not find this.
question : mechanism works via a plan, so can you consider this plan as
not a question anymore: found this on the net : mechanism is using an
external teleology: the purpuse to be realized is not immanent in the
thing: it is presupposed by an agent or devine:
difference : difference is not evolution of species but evolution of
life. evolution of species
motor of being : does not give a fundamental account on it.
question : how does darwin see the true nature of live: immannent or
difference: not defined by hardt or deleuze: i expect that difference is
again a difference between things, (like aritstotles)
motor of being : the motor is teleological : the good is external to life.
difference: difference is going to an "infinte externality": thing
differs with all the rest.
motor of being : teleological development of the mind ?
question: hegel is using an interal teleology = living organisms , but
needs an external at the end = teleological model of the whole ? is this
6) to answer your reply
i made a mistake, i wrote: aristotles : him a transcendent philosopher?
i wanted to say: a philosophy of transcendence.
7)i'm not completely oke, with your sentence : In my eyes, Kant is to a
a restricted version of Spinoza with emphasis on "subjectivty". your
explanation didn't get through, it was a bit fast.
but i'm intrigued by the powerful sentence. please elaborate a bit, it
ps: i'm trying to make a flowchart of some thought of deleuze. if they
are ready i'll try to post them on this forum.
Harald Wenk schreef:
> Dear filip,
> Very astonishing to read you again, again without
> any introduction or explanation.
> I already wrete a lot here, on some questions, especially on
> difference and mechanics
> (Question 3, Nietzsche, non equilibrium mechanics, Stengers, Prigorin).
> Aristotle is a very big "thing" in philosophy.
> To answer your question 1,
> Normally transcendental means, from the
> most influentual Kantian framework in this respect:
> The condition of the possibility of.....
> Now, the main tune in Aristotle is:
> Knowing is knowing by causality.
> So, as his first mover is ousia, which means essence, substance and
> some more
> combine this "transcendental" in a causal manner:
> Being the condition of the possibility of movement, as it is
> the causing mover without being caused,
> that is the first mover.
> The "ontologocal status" of Kants transcendentals are not so clear.
> Because of purity of thinking as we don't know it, says the
> "idealistic school,
> because of unjustfierd scepticism on "independent" existence of the
> real world,
> say the realists, like Arsitoltle.
> In my eyes the idelistic school is defintely ruled out by real atomism,
> which was very surprising in its real empirical data, therefore
> not preformed by our "conception".
> Even more convinving are cosmological data,
> where Kant may have the scepsis, if it is really
> "all" of effects, what we get from universe.
> But this was already foreseen by the realist Spinoza with his infinity
> of unknown
> attributes. In my eyes, Kant is to a high degree
> a restricted version of Spinoza with emphasis on "subjectivty".
> You know, that "movement" in Arsitotle meant "change" (kinesis) in a
> sense, but which, by hard work of natural science, can be brought back
> to movement. The body mind problem or theory of the soul, desire,
> power to act on its own,
> you mentioned, is very intriguing too,
> The answer here is, that the substance is the cause of the desire to
> desire thinking
> as the best or highest action, theoria, taken up by Kant.
> This dominance of theoria is thus transcendental.
> Note that kinematic means, that the framework of movement remains,
> while dynamics
> means that the framework or system of movement changes.
> After this pleasure of telling some Aristotle,
> and answering your question 1,
> a little more context would be welcome,
> making answers, which are laborious, a bit more easier.
> For example references to definitions
> technical scale of the question and answers.
> Maybe you already finished or gave up your work on Deleuze's Difference.
> I hope you recoverd from your sickness you mentioned a while ago.
> Best regards
> Harald Wenk
> From: "filip" <fildh at gmx.net>
> Sent: Saturday, July 04, 2009 6:43 PM
> To: <deleuze-guattari at lists.driftline.org>
> Subject: [D-G] internal, external teleology, immanence, transcendence
>> Hello everybody,
>> i got some questions.
>> In "difference and repetition" and "la conception de la difference
>> cheze bergson" deleuze attacks some philosophers for seeing
>> difference as external difference or not as difference at all.
>> *1)aristotles: *difference between things is no real difference
>> still Aristotels uses internal teleology which gives the things there
>> own purpose and power
>> aristotles needs the unmoved move to give a final acoount of what is:
>> so that makes him a transcendent philosopher?
>> *2)mechanism: *difference as a closed mechanical structure : no
>> newness is possible.
>> QUESTION 2
>> mechanism is using an internal teleological model: is this true ?
>> *3)darwin:* difference is not evolution of species but evolution of
>> life. evolution of species
>> does not give an fundamental account on live itself
>> QUESTION 3
>> how does Darwin see the true nature of life ? immanent / transcendent.
>> *4)plato:* difference is not teleological inspired: the good is
>> external to life.
>> QUESTION 4
>> plato has an external teleological model. Is an external teleological
>> model not always transcendent ?
>> *5)hegel* : difference is going to an "infinte externality": thing
>> differs with all the rest.
>> QUESTION 5
>> hegel is using an interal teleology, but needs an external at the end
>> ? is this true ?
>> List address: deleuze-guattari at driftline.org
>> Archives: www.driftline.org
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