[D-G] Jeepers, more Violence

NZ pretzelworld at gmail.com
Thu Sep 28 15:41:08 PDT 2006

here is the proposition (#2) which deleuze omits from his book, I
don't think its "dangerous" but it certainly allows for that
"difference" - with which composing bodies, ie rhizomes, are
ill-suited to deal. Not quite the lockean loophole you wanted to find
but its pretty darn close.

Prop. II.
(from II - VI, Bk.XIV:1:79, 81)

Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
nothing in common.

Premise 2. No two substances can share an attribute.
Proof: If they share an attribute, they would be identical. Therefore
they can only be individuated by their modes. But then they would
depend on their modes for their identity. This would have the sub-
stance being dependent on its mode, in violation of premise 1.
Therefore, two substances cannot share the same attribute.

I am still flabbergasted by the rhetoric regarding Nero and the
sabine-ethics which judge him. As far as I am aware spinoza is well
known for his logical mind, but don't these ethics come from spinoza,
not deleuze? I can understand deleuze being a sloppy logician but not
spinoza. Sure i can see spinoza's mega-machine being a complete
logical system but that doesn't mean that the ground it sits on is
complete. but then for deleuze to fall into the same rabbit hole, its
almost absurd, but that's what I like about deleuze, his humanity is
full of inconsistent tangents which help enlarge consciousness by
additive example. so for modern system of polemical philosophy, of
course DyG need to attach their thoughts to a mega-machine (re: BwO
via spinoza), and spinoza is one of the most base. so from within the
mega-machine, it looks complete, yet from outside it is just a flawed
as any solipsistic pov that feigns absoluteness.

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