[D-G] within psychiatry
hwenk at web.de
Tue Feb 14 12:22:02 PST 2006
you interpretation of Spinoza is very literal, following his words very closely.
Now there is a little bit background needed.
In a certain way Spinoza and other philosophers of the 17. century
Locke or Malebranche, most prominent Berkeley
started with the consciousness - inspired by Descartes -
and the feeling and thinking of I or oneself which is
what is real in a primary sense.
The body is only present in mind as being affected, which also means modified which, as you
pointed out, is mostly to be understand as a change from one
state to another. As the feelings
are felt without interruption, or in intervals, they are
continuous giving the variation.
So Spinoza meant, to identify an affect, there must be
an idea of what affects. It is possible to be affected without identifying the
body or idea doing so - a change of mood, you don't where it comes from.
You know that ideas are only affected by ideas and bodies are only affected by
So the body affects your body and the ideas of the body affect your idea - which at first is the idea of your body - what
you feel as affection.
So if you love somebody you are pleased to see him or you are affected with joy
connected with the idea of the beloved person - in your example more Peter than Paul.
That are the affections coming from the outside.
But there is also a continuous stream of self affection, not bound
to present ideas or remembering past ones.
In Spinoza and tradition there has to be a stream of tiny affections from the
outward to make you feel yourself, but this in my eyes is hard to hold.
This is happiness bound to the idea of the body and mind of oneself in experiencing yourself.
Also Spinoza pointed rightly out, an affect is more determined from the affected body than
from the affecting one.
That means that the idea of the things or people affecting you
disturb or change your self affection, which is your way
of perceiving the world - including moods.
And this way is the most important for you.
So don't expect too much from outer things and let
Why are people are able to make you feel sad?
Even people you are thinking they want to suppress you.
In old days this problem had led to the radical
autonomous variant of not clinging to anything - taken religious only clinging to god.
The reason is that all finite existing things including people
are bound to change or to be destroyed, so that the happiness gained from them
turns into sadness - if Peter or your beloved woman dies for example or don't loves you
anymore with the intensity you are used to.
This is also an argument of Spinoza in his short treaties on
god, man and his happiness.
As Spinoza takes God to be nature he turns classical
in knowing god or nature is happiness for eternity as nature or god is for eternity.
This is the reason why Spinoza is taken as having one leg in the old scholastic
and religious tradition
and the other one in modern science an ethic with highest emphasis to scientific knowledge.
Now to the argument concerning the sadness of the priests and the government.
Of course you know, they do so for educational reasons,
in order to bring people to behave to what they think
is necessary for a cultural and safe life.
Of course they overwhelm a lot,
people in a certain way as naughty kids.
On the other hand, the reason for the distinction between good and bad and not
evil - a point on which Deleuze insists very much relating it to Nietzsche -
is that your self affections are bound to a good functioning of body and mind - virtue.
This is stated explicitly by Spinoza.
For the body he refers to medicine, which in my eyes as a yogi is too little, and
for the mind he refers to science or knowledge writing an essay
concerning the improvement of the mind - a theme often handled in the
17. century by famous essays of Locke, Hume, Leibniz and others.
So he tried to avoid sadness by learning correct or adequate thinking,
making your mind and feelings a little bit stable against outer catastrophes.
This is stoic virtue concerning thinking and the reason for writing his "Ethic"
- giving happiness in your self affections by learning right thinking and right doing.
Thus he often states "Under the guidance of reason" in book three, four and five of the "Ethic".
Under the guidance of reason you avoid destroying your body and mind and keep them
like a garden flowering.
And there is a lot of sadness by doing harm to your body and mind by yourself.
This is the case in hate or excessive drinking, not thinking in the long run future .. - to be honest there are a lot
of bad things for Spinoza that are also evil things for the priests.
So often only the argument has changed, but the behaviour demanded is the same.
It is not to forget, that Spinozas Ethic is one centred to
individual and personal behaviour, not so much a political ethic.
This is also in antique tradition.
So - take a look at yourself to avoid sadness.
But in order to magnify or reach the greatest happiness of the greatest number - which would also guarantee your own one -
reasonable to generalize the way you find to happiness and avoidance of sadness
to all people - which of course includes safety and political and economical thinking.
greetings Harald Wenk
From: deleuze-guattari-bounces at lists.driftline.org
[mailto:deleuze-guattari-bounces at lists.driftline.org]On Behalf Of Ismael
Sent: Sonntag, 12. Februar 2006 03:30
To: deleuze-guattari at lists.driftline.org
Subject: [D-G] within psychiatry
I like all événement music événement. But this list is very sad, in a
spinozean-deleuzian-ishmael-and-others-various-others point of no-view and
no-return. You call psychiatry speaking a lot of shit like you speak. It´s a
lot of decadence, not événement.
This list, with your callings to psychiatrychzing you, is very sad. You´re
very sad, do not allowing any événement in this list, Pierre-Εφαιλτης-Liza.
<<<<<<<<I would say that for Spinoza there is a continuous variation—and
> this is what it means to exist—of the force of existing or of the power of
> How is this linked to my stupid example, which comes, however, from
> Spinoza, "Hello Pierre, hello Paul"? When I see Pierre who displeases me, an
> idea, the idea of Pierre, is given to me; when I see Paul who pleases me,
> the idea of Paul is given to me. Each one of these ideas in relation to me
> has a certain degree of reality or perfection. I would say that the idea of
> Paul, in relation to me, has more intrinsic perfection than the idea of
> Pierre since the idea of Paul contents me and the idea of Pierre upsets me.
> When the idea of Paul succeeds the idea of Pierre, it is agreeable to say
> that my force of existing or my power of acting is increased or improved;
> when, on the contrary, the situation is reversed, when after having seen
> someone who made me joyful I then see someone who makes me sad, I say that
> my power of acting is inhibited or obstructed. At this level we don't even
> know anymore if we are still working within terminological conventions or if
> we are already moving into something much more concrete.
> I would say that, to the extent that ideas succeed each other in us, each
> one having its own degree of perfection, its degree of reality or intrinsic
> perfection, the one who has these ideas, in this case me, never stops
> passing from one degree of perfection to another. In other words there is a
> continuous variation in the form of an
> increase-diminution-increase-diminution of the power of acting or the force
> of existing of someone according to the ideas which s/he has. Feel how
> beauty shines through this difficult exercise. This representation of
> existence already isn't bad, it really is existence in the street, it's
> necessary to imagine Spinoza strolling about, and he truly lives existence
> as this kind of continuous variation: to the extent that an idea replaces
> another, I never cease to pass from one degree of perfection to another,
> however miniscule the difference, and this kind of melodic line of
> continuous variation will define affect (affectus) in its correlation with
> ideas and at the same time in its difference in nature from ideas. We
> account for this difference in nature and this correlation. It's up to you
> to say whether it agrees with you or not. We have got an entirely more solid
> definition of affectus; affectus in Spinoza is variation (he is speaking
> through my mouth; he didn't say it this way because he died too young...),
> continuous variation of the force of existing, insofar as this variation is
> determined by the ideas one has.
> Consequently, in a very important text at the end of book three, which
> bears the title "general definition of affectus," Spinoza tells us: above
> all do not believe that affectus as I conceive it depends upon a comparison
> of ideas. He means that the idea indeed has to be primary in relation to the
> affect, the idea and the affect are two things which differ in nature, the
> affect is not reducible to an intellectual comparison of ideas, affect is
> constituted by the lived transition or lived passage from one degree of
> perfection to another, insofar as this passage is determined by ideas; but
> in itself it does not consist in an idea, but rather constitutes affect.
> When I pass from the idea of Pierre to the idea of Paul, I say that my power
> of acting is increased; when I pass from the idea of Paul to the idea of
> Pierre, I say that my power of acting is diminished. Which comes down to
> saying that when I see Pierre, I am affected with sadness; when I see Paul,
> I am affected with joy. And on this melodic line of continuous variation
> constituted by the affect, Spinoza will assign two poles: joy-sadness, which
> for him will be the fundamental passions. Sadness will be any passion
> whatsoever which involves a diminution of my power of acting, and joy will
> be any passion involving an increase in my power of acting. This conception
> will allow Spinoza to become aware, for example, of a quite fundamental
> moral and political problem which will be his way of posing the political
> problem to himself: how does it happen that people who have power [pouvoir],
> in whatever domain, need to affect us in a sad way? The sad passions as
> necessary. Inspiring sad passions is necessary for the exercise of power.
> And Spinoza says, in the Theological-Political Treatise, that this is a
> profound point of connection between the despot and the priest—they both
> need the sadness of their subjects. Here you understand well that he does
> not take sadness in a vague sense, he takes sadness in the rigorous sense he
> knew to give it: sadness is the affect insofar as it involves the diminution
> of my power of acting.>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Take it babe
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