[D-G] within psychiatry

[Ismael Pequod]

I like all événement music événement. But this list is very sad, in a
spinozean-deleuzian-ishmael-and-others-various-others point of no-view and
no-return. You call psychiatry speaking a lot of shit like you speak. It´s a
lot of decadence, not événement.

This list, with your callings to psychiatrychzing you, is very sad. You´re
very sad, do not allowing any événement in this list, Pierre-Εφαιλτης-Liza.

<<<<<<<<I would say that for Spinoza there is a continuous variation—and
> this is what it means to exist—of the force of existing or of the power of
> acting.
> How is this linked to my stupid example, which comes, however, from
> Spinoza, "Hello Pierre, hello Paul"? When I see Pierre who displeases me, an
> idea, the idea of Pierre, is given to me; when I see Paul who pleases me,
> the idea of Paul is given to me. Each one of these ideas in relation to me
> has a certain degree of reality or perfection. I would say that the idea of
> Paul, in relation to me, has more intrinsic perfection than the idea of
> Pierre since the idea of Paul contents me and the idea of Pierre upsets me.
> When the idea of Paul succeeds the idea of Pierre, it is agreeable to say
> that my force of existing or my power of acting is increased or improved;
> when, on the contrary, the situation is reversed, when after having seen
> someone who made me joyful I then see someone who makes me sad, I say that
> my power of acting is inhibited or obstructed. At this level we don't even
> know anymore if we are still working within terminological conventions or if
> we are already moving into something much more concrete.
> I would say that, to the extent that ideas succeed each other in us, each
> one having its own degree of perfection, its degree of reality or intrinsic
> perfection, the one who has these ideas, in this case me, never stops
> passing from one degree of perfection to another. In other words there is a
> continuous variation in the form of an
> increase-diminution-increase-diminution of the power of acting or the force
> of existing of someone according to the ideas which s/he has. Feel how
> beauty shines through this difficult exercise. This representation of
> existence already isn't bad, it really is existence in the street, it's
> necessary to imagine Spinoza strolling about, and he truly lives existence
> as this kind of continuous variation: to the extent that an idea replaces
> another, I never cease to pass from one degree of perfection to another,
> however miniscule the difference, and this kind of melodic line of
> continuous variation will define affect (affectus) in its correlation with
> ideas and at the same time in its difference in nature from ideas. We
> account for this difference in nature and this correlation. It's up to you
> to say whether it agrees with you or not. We have got an entirely more solid
> definition of affectus; affectus in Spinoza is variation (he is speaking
> through my mouth; he didn't say it this way because he died too young...),
> continuous variation of the force of existing, insofar as this variation is
> determined by the ideas one has.
> Consequently, in a very important text at the end of book three, which
> bears the title "general definition of affectus," Spinoza tells us: above
> all do not believe that affectus as I conceive it depends upon a comparison
> of ideas. He means that the idea indeed has to be primary in relation to the
> affect, the idea and the affect are two things which differ in nature, the
> affect is not reducible to an intellectual comparison of ideas, affect is
> constituted by the lived transition or lived passage from one degree of
> perfection to another, insofar as this passage is determined by ideas; but
> in itself it does not consist in an idea, but rather constitutes affect.
> When I pass from the idea of Pierre to the idea of Paul, I say that my power
> of acting is increased; when I pass from the idea of Paul to the idea of
> Pierre, I say that my power of acting is diminished. Which comes down to
> saying that when I see Pierre, I am affected with sadness; when I see Paul,
> I am affected with joy. And on this melodic line of continuous variation
> constituted by the affect, Spinoza will assign two poles: joy-sadness, which
> for him will be the fundamental passions. Sadness will be any passion
> whatsoever which involves a diminution of my power of acting, and joy will
> be any passion involving an increase in my power of acting. This conception
> will allow Spinoza to become aware, for example, of a quite fundamental
> moral and political problem which will be his way of posing the political
> problem to himself: how does it happen that people who have power [pouvoir],
> in whatever domain, need to affect us in a sad way? The sad passions as
> necessary. Inspiring sad passions is necessary for the exercise of power.
> And Spinoza says, in the Theological-Political Treatise, that this is a
> profound point of connection between the despot and the priest—they both
> need the sadness of their subjects. Here you understand well that he does
> not take sadness in a vague sense, he takes sadness in the rigorous sense he
> knew to give it: sadness is the affect insofar as it involves the diminution
> of my power of acting.>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>

Take it babe