[D-G] Communism definitions Physics

[Johnatan Petterson]

as to Nietzsche's quote in your mention,
I'd reckon Fried. Nietzsche was talking (perceptually?) or anyway
historically rather
than conceptually. When mentioning "christian god", sure does he think about
the figure of the Jesus Christ dude. Nietzsche is often ironical and the
will to truth
is speaking of the people who come as the historical followers of the
historical Jesus Christ.
The Figure of Christ "in the mind" of the followers "works" and produces a
religious effect,
what Widder calls faith and which is just a feeling. Feeling encompasses
both Reason and Faith, again the both self destruct as concepts
when you consider the necessity of producing concepts within the full
feeling.
Whether Aquinas proves the concept
of that feeling, that is if nobody is missing the definition he gives,
would probably not
matter for Nietzsche. That was Nietzsche's novelty in the history of
philosophy, its
*Unzeitgemässetikheidt (?) *Nietzsche took pleasure with playing with such
"personnages conceptuels" as
Aquinas or Jesus Christ, because he did not feel the need to prove his
concept (besides knowing his concepts full well)
unlikely anxious in a way that nobody would miss it, or not dig it. That
was what he meant by a sudden "will to truth"
killing Jesus Christ in such a Roman Crucifixion Drama. The followers are a
metaphor for such historians of philosophy such
as Nathan Widder. How ironical innit? Bravo Fried.!! carry on,
Continuation, please!!

Le jeu. 14 mars 2019 à 01:19, Mike Lansing <badger2 at mail2world.com> a
écrit :

> Widder's text to begin an exegesis. Firstly, here is where Aquinas
> looses it:
>
> 'Although the truth of the christian faith exceeds the capacity of
> human reason, truths that reason is fitted by nature to know cannot be
> contrary to the truth of faith. The things that reason is fitted by
> nature to know are clearly most true, and it would be impossible to
> think of them as false. It is also wrong to think that something that
> is held by faith could be false since it is clearly confirmed by god.
> Since we know by definition that what is false is contrary to the
> truth, it is impossible for the principles that reason knows by nature
> to be contrary to the truth of faith. (Summa Contra Gentiles 1.7, in
> Aquinas 1988:4)
>
> The impossibility of confirming a precept held by faith seems not to
> bother Aquinas here, but it does illuminate a central dilemma both he
> and his successors face. The attempt to make philosophy a handmaiden of
> theology calls for concessions on both sides, and it becomes impossible
> to maintain a dual loyalty. The demand to be true to both reason and
> faith ultimately undermines both. Hence as Nitzsche declares, the
> christian god is killed by the christian will to truth
> itself....Analogy and univocity emerge as the possible answers to the
> problem of categories and are extended in one direction toward the
> problem of individuation and in the other toward the relation between
> god and his creatures. Here too, difficulties arise, since analogy
> fails to account for individuation, while univocity threatens to
> demolish divine transcendence unless strict limitations are imposed.
> Ultimately, however, these limitations rest on the very faith that is
> precariously tied to and supported by reason.'
> (Widder, Reason and Faith: Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Ockham, in
> Genealogies of Difference, p. 115)
>
> Aquinas looses it precisely where the signifier god is smuggled in to
> represent the signified, which for the latter is thinking DNA forged
> from the crusty lips of a volcano, thus killing by default the
> signifier that goes with it. Aquinas in copula with both signifier and
> signified corresponds to religion in safe copula with the State and
> capitalism due to the habituation of theogonic reproduction (as per
> Shults' Iconoclastic Theology). We are not arguing against replacement
> of concept with percept, but are reinforcing Deleuze's project to
> empower life in the wake of such violences already mentioned.
>
> We must add Widder's passage on the middle term because of the
> impossible trident and its perception: an Indigene can perceive the
> trident correctly, though "civilized" humans may have more trouble. Why
> is this so? Have you contemplated the Wiki page for the Impossible
> Trident? One can insert Bernie Sanders' socialism or else something
> like Widder's passage:
>
> '....based on complex propositions such as "Socrates is white."
> Nevertheless, judgment, which assigns predicates to a subject -- or
> quasi attributes in the case of the divine, since a purely simple being
> does not admit such an act of predication -- refers back to
> apprehension as simple knowledge of being, and here there is no room
> for analogy: between statements "god is [a being] and "socrates is is
> [a being]" there can only be univocity or equivocity. Aquinas here
> accepts equivocity, maintaining that reason can demonstrate god's
> existence and analogically ascribe certain attributes to him but that
> the divine being remains opaque. This move functions on the division
> between essence and existence, and it forces Aquinas to admit that his
> demonstrations of god's existence do not live up to stract Aristotelian
> standards for demonstrative proof, which require a definition of the
> thing in question -- that is, its essence -- as a middle term in its
> syllogism.....To this Duns Scotus replies: "There is no point in
> distinguishing between a knowledge of his essence and a knowledge of
> his existence....For I never know anything to exist unless I first have
> some concept of that which existence is affirmed." '
> (Widder, p.125)
>
> We are now in a much better position to forge concepts of abiogenesis
> (see Wikipedia for Abiogenesis and the Miller-Urey volcanic spark
> experiment) and the inorganic life that began there.
>
>
>