[D-G] Communism definitions Physics

[Mike Lansing]

Bernie Sanders's Socialism as the Middle Tine of the Impossible Trident

'It is not naturally evident that the god of theology, who is both
three and one and absolutely perfect and omnipotent, actually exists or
that he is good or wise, although "from this it does follow that we
cannot prove another conclusion in which 'good' or 'wise' is predicated
of a concept of god, if by 'god' we understand 'something to which
nothing is superior in perfection or prior.' For the existence of god
in this sense can be demonstrated." Philosophy's use to theology
therefore rests on its ability to demonstrate conclusions of the same
type as theology produces using a different middle term. Nevertheless,
to the degree that reason is stripped of the tools used for explicating
these traits, its applications are minimal. It is not even possible to
follow Scotus in demonstrating the existence of only one god, let alone
show whether any being could be infinite in the theological sense.
Reason can show that a being to which nothing else is more noble must
exist, but it cannot say that only one such being exists.'
(Widder op cit pp. 137-8)


<-----Original Message-----> 
>From: Mike Lansing [badger2 at mail2world.com]
>Sent: 2/21/2019 5:47:34 PM
>To: deleuze-guattari at lists.driftline.org
>Subject: Re: [D-G] Communism definitions Physics
>
>Johnny wrote: 'because the word perception seems to imply that the
mind
>suffers.'
>
>According to Hardt and Negri's necessary labor vs surplus labor as
>being the pivot of the impossibility of socialism, Bernie Sanders's
>socialism, the Impossible Trident
>
>Impossible Trident
>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossible_trident
>
>Though capitalism's rabidity and bulemia is now attempting to subsume
>all social labor.
>
>'the (Transcendental)formal being undoes the sadness of its
conatus....'
>
>For perception, note how the middle tine of the trident can both appear
>and disappear.
>
>'To free individuals from the concepts imperfectly applied to them, as
>Ockham sought to do, requires articulating a prior disunity and
>dispersion escaping all identity, from which the simple individual as a
>ground for abstraction both appears and disintegrates. It is only
>appropriate, even if ironic, that this conclusion -- which dissolves
>the christian god as well -- should follow from christian philosophy
>itself.'
>(Widder N, Genealogies of Difference, p.148)
>
>'so shall we find one single and same order, that is one single
>connection of causes....'
>
>On questions of necessary labor....
>
>'Agan, what exists must be separated from the way it is cognized.
>Certainly, existence as predicated of god differs from that predicated
>of his creatures, for he exists necessarily and they do not: "For that
>reason, there is no distinction in god between 'that which is' and
>'that in virtue of which it is,' because there is not anything
>different from god in virtue of which god is. But in a creature there
>is distinction, because that which a creature is and that in virtue of
>which a creature is are simply distinct, just as god and a creature are
>distinct." This does not, however, establish a real distinction within
>either being, as though essence were what the thing is and existence
>were that by virtue of which it is. It is thus fallacious to derive the
>existence of god from huis essence of god from his essence, for this is
>to demonstrate something on the basis of itself. It is also impossible
>to establish hierarchy based on the increasing convergence of essence
>and existence, since all beings are equal in their dependence on god
>for existence.
>
>In these ways Ockham's razor limits the resources reason can rightly
>use ro demonstrate the existence of god. Clearly Ockham's criticism of
>Scotus seriously distort the latter's understanding of essential order,
>consistently treating sequentially ordered causes as essentially
>ordered, but they are consistent with the constraints he has developed.
>First, the categorical distinctions necessary for establishing such an
>order as static are only mental constructions. There can be no real
>ordering among the four types of cause, for example, because the
>supremacy given to telos rests on the logic that the whole is greater
>than the sum of its parts, and therefore prior to them, but Ockham
>views a whole as nothing more than an aggregate. Similarly, the
>argument that an accidental order of causes must refer to a permanent
>order because change takes place only in virtue of something unchanging
>illicitly invokes a real universal.'
>(Widder, op cit pp. 135-6)
>
>"Virtue, I have quit your tyranny."
>(Marguerite Porete, burned as a heretic, 1 Jun 1310, Place de greve,
>Paris)
>
><-----Original Message-----> 
>>From: Dewey Dell [dewey.dell5 at gmail.com]
>>Sent: 2/20/2019 3:02:52 PM
>>To: deleuze-guattari at lists.driftline.org
>>Subject: Re: [D-G] Communism definitions Physics
>>
>>hello Mike,
>>
>>
>>i am sorry i cannot answer asap with a text from Nick Land on
>socialism in
>>the USA
>>this would deserve some work of research from me.
>>
>>in the meantime here is the posted text by Andrew Culp on today's Dank
>>Deleuze Guattari Facebook Group.
>>
>><< Many of these writers draw upon the 'empiricism' of a philosopher
>>
>>whose thought will inform my own, alternative, approach: Gilles
>Deleuze.
>>
>>The exact status of this empiricism is, however, a strong point
>>
>>of contention within the secondary literature.
>>
>>By his own definition, Deleuze uses a reworked version of
philosophical
>>
>>empiricism whereby 'empiricism is a philosophy of the imagination and
>not
>>
>> a philosophy of the senses'. Demonstrating the importance of the
>>imagination,
>>
>>he readily draws upon the literary works of the Anglo-American writers
>>
>>to demonstrate its principles. In his strictly philosophical work,
>>
>>it appears as the paradoxical formulation of a 'transcendental
>empiricism'
>>
>>as a philosophical alternative to Kant's transcendental idealism,
>>
>>in which the transcendental field is separated from its empirical
>givenness
>>
>>to bypass the personal, individuated world of the subject.
>>
>>In the recent secondary literature, many writers have departed
>>
>>from the object-orientated camp by following Deleuze's claim that
>>
>>this empiricism 'treats concept as object of an encounter'.
>>
>>They clarify that Deleuze's empiricism is strictly concerned with
>>
>>the real conditions of thought and thus fundamentally uninterested
>>
>>in an empirical tracking of the habits of thought expressed in lived
>>experience [vécu].
>>
>> Taking seriously Deleuze's separation of the transcendental form of
>>
>>the empirical, these thinkers focus on concepts and not ethnography
>>
>> or personal reflection ('for the data of empirical lived experience
>>
>> doesn't inform thought about what it can do'). Shifting the focus
>>
>> to concepts is part of their wider move to claim that
>>
>>'there is no "ontology of Deleuze"'.
>>
>>They appeal to Deleuze and Guattari's suggestion
>>
>> in the introduction of A Thousand Plateaus to 'overthrow ontology'
>>
>> by substituting what 'is' for Hume's ongoing series of interacting
>>
>>exterior relations 'and...and...and...'. The philosophical consequence
>>
>> of the concept-based approach is an engagement with the outside as a
>>
>> relative exteriority beyond sensory givens. Interestingly,
>>
>> this is also how Foucault defines the experience of thought.>>
>>
>>
>> §
>>
>>
>>here comes the definition by wikkipedia / google of surplus labor /
>>necessary labor
>>
>>
>>*Surplus labour* (German: Mehrarbeit) is a concept used
>>
>> by Karl Marx in his critique of political economy.
>>
>>It means *labour* performed in excess of the *labour necessary*
>>
>>to produce the means of livelihood of the *worker* ("*necessary
>labour*").
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> §
>>
>>
>>and here comes SPINOZA's Ethics Book II Prop 7 Scolie (Trad.Génicot)
>>
>>
>>(tease out)(...)
>>
>><<Par exemple, un cercle existant dans la Nature et l'idée du cercle
>>existant,
>>
>>laquelle est aussi en Dieu, sont une seule et même chose, qui
>s'explique
>>par des attributs différents; et ainsi,
>>
>>que nous concevions la Nature soit sous l'attribut de l'Etendue, soit
>>
>>sous l'attribut de la Pensée, soit sous quelque autre, nous trouverons
>un
>>seul et
>>
>>même ordre, autrement dit une seule connexion des causes, c'est-à-dire
>les
>>mêmes choses
>>
>>se suivant les unes les autres.(...)>> <<(Et lorsque j'ai dit) 
>que 
>>Dieu est
>>cause de l'idée, par
>>
>>exemple du cercle en tant seulement qu'il est chose pensante, et du
>cercle
>>en tant seulement
>>
>>qu'il est chose étendue, ce n'est pour aucune
>>
>>autre raison, sinon que l'être formel de l'idée du cercle ne peut être
>perçu
>>
>>que par un autre mode de penser qui en est comme la cause prochaine,
>>celui-ci à
>>
>>son tour par un autre, et ainsi à l'infini (...)>>
>>
>>
>>>> For instance, a circle existing in Nature, and the idea of the 
>>existing
>>circle, this idea being as well in God,
>>
>>are each one single and same thing, explained away by different
>attributes;
>>and so, whether we conceive Nature either
>>
>>under the attribute Extension, either under the attribute Thought,
>either
>>under any other attribute, so shall we find one single
>>
>>and same order, that is one single connection of causes, that is the
>same
>>things following up each one another. (...)>>
>>
>>(And when I say) that God is the cause of the idea, for instance of
the
>>circle in that it is a thinking thing, and the cause of the circle
>>
>>in that it is an extended thing, it is for no other reason, if not for
>the
>>formal being of the idea of the circle not to be otherwise perceived
>than by
>>
>>another mode of thought which is to the circle as a next of kin cause,
>the
>>latter in turn to be perceived by another next of kin cause, and so ad
>>infinitum.(...)>>
>>
>>
>>
>>-§- (as well) - § -
>>
>>
>>Eth. Book II Definitions III
>>
>>
>><< - Par idée, j'entends un concept de l'Esprit, que l'Esprit forme 
>>parce
>>qu'il est une
>>
>>chose pensante.
>>
>>
>>Je dis concept plutôt que perception, parce que le mot perception
>semble
>>indiquer que l'Esprit pâtit d'un objet,
>>
>>tandis que concept semble exprimer une action de l'Esprit. >>
>>
>>
>>>>By idea, I understand a concept of the Mind, that the Mind forms 
>>because
>>it is a thinking thing.
>>
>>I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception
>seems to
>>imply that the Mind suffers
>>
>>from an object, whereas concept seems to express an action of the 
>>Mind.>>
>>
>>
>>
>>///
>>
>>
>>Do you mean Mike Lansing in your post today that a worker in USA
>>
>>or a worker in France have a different surplus labor?
>>
>>I in any case am not sure of the definition offered by
>Google/Wikkypedia
>>
>>( seek above) because it seems obvious that I work a lot, like at this
>>present moment, sending this message,
>>
>>in a way which could be defined by either definition of necessary
>labor or
>>
>>surplus labor, according to where we cut the Time Line and its
>encompassed
>>Vision.
>>
>>Besides something is existing between the recipient(s) of the message
>and
>>
>>the executive producer of the message. This produced thing is both
>real and
>>behaving and becoming with a neighbor: distance:
>>
>>the same things (formal being) are to be found in
>>
>>one single connection of causes. It grows or decreases. As such it is
>>perceived within a Ratio by the Mind. We could say that to cut Time
>Line is
>>trying to tease out a phase (ie. a partial object) instead than
>>
>>a full concept. Yet Time does not exist. Time is a partial object or
>>partial concept. Extension exists but Time does not. The text by these
>>secondary Philosophers espousing in Andrew Culp's
>>
>>vision of transcendental empiricism, this text shows this not: it cuts
>out
>>a part of reality (ironically
>>
>>when we find on same Facebook group today Sam Bhag, the correspondent
>with
>>Andrew Culp, deals with the Winnicott partial objects in Three
>Ecology).
>>
>>But the Vision or Ratio of the Time Line _can_ or _should_ exist.
>>
>>It is part of Perception. A Perception as Concept, or as Action. A
>Sensible
>>Intensity that can be approximated
>>
>>with another according to a certain Ratio. This Ratio belongs to the
>>Deleuzo-Foucaldian requisite of concept-based
>>
>>approach (ie. 'a relative exteriority beyond sensory givens' ) because
>the
>>sensory given (or the sensory produced, when happily this event
>happens)
>>
>>is always an Intensity, extension being the increase or decrease of a
>>formal being. The latter being affected
>>
>>by positive affections, either sad or happy. So remains the question
>of the
>>collectivity . This is where Ethics come
>>
>>involved within the definition of Marx's necessary or surplus labor.
>The
>>necessary labor requisite comes verified when the sensory comes
>produced
>>within
>>
>>a necessary increase of the producers' sensibility. This happens when
>the
>>(Transcendental) formal being undoes the sadness of the struggle of
its
>>
>>conatus, which can in certain circumstances encompass ignorance of the
>>Transcendentality of its Being, or its Self-Re-flexion. When
Narcissism
>>ends up with The vanishing Illusion of Inertia.
>>
>>a Space-Time understood by its emotion(s): as surplus affection or
>>decreased affection(s) of the commune (notion) shared by channels or
>>attributes
>>
>>of new other Space-Times. (ie Space-Time agents or patients) . The
>latter
>>can be given with 'conceptual exteriority' only within distance, ie.
>>within the Vision of increase or decrease of
>>
>>interaction(s) taking the shapes, or ratios, of intensities.
>>
>>
>>
>> Very Respectuously,
>>
>>
>>Johnny Petterson.
>>
>>
>>On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 6:45 PM Mike Lansing 
><badger2 at mail2world.com> 
>>wrote:
>>
>>> We look forward to discourse from Nick Land or these other
>>> communist/post-communist philosophers because of the deadly
>democratic
>>> socialist thrust beginning to gather momentum inside the American
>>> rhizome. If Hardt and Negri are correct in stating that the pivot of
>>> socialism, the point at which it becomes impossible is necessary
>labor
>>> vs. surplus labor, then we must tease out differences between UK,
>>> France, Venezuela, U.S. from the confusion.
>>>
>>> 'On a January evening in 1934, approximately 6,000 Chicagoans
>gathered
>>> in the city's large Coliseum Hall to celebrate and remember Lenin.
It
>>> was the kind of evening that brought out the complexities of
>Communism
>>> in the city. "In behalf of the American Communist Party," the main
>>> speaker declared, "I say that the one program which will bring unity
>to
>>> the American people is the program of Lenin." ....In a sense, this
>>> occasion honoring Lenin's memory had already begun the work of
>unifying
>>> American people across the lines of age, sex, ethnicity, and
>>> occupation. And yet Communists clearly had their work cut out for
>them.
>>> American Federation of Labor leaders, the speaker warned the crowd,
>>> equated Lenin's program with "a Russian program - not one for the
>>> United States."
>>> ....
>>> What did this diverse grouping of Chicagoans find relevant about
>Lenin
>>> and the Communist party? How are students of American history
>supposed
>>> to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory images: one of an
>>> organization that celebrated Soviet leaders, co-opted Soviet
symbols,
>>> and embraced revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology, and on the
>other
>>> a somewhat popular American social movement comprised of a wide
array
>>> of otherwise ordinary people?'
>>> (Storch R, Red Chicago: American Communism at Its Grassroots,
>1928-35)
>>>
>>>
>>_______________________________________________
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