[D-G] 1949 Diss. on Spinoza and Vedanta
superdragon at addlebrain.com
Sat Jan 17 10:02:11 PST 2009
> As with yourself, I am more in favour of subjectivities for
> better or worse these days. It should not be forgotten that
> Deleuze also talks about resubjectification
Do you mean "reterritorialisation"?
Partially. I would still advocate the desubjectification (and deterritorialisation) of the transcendental ego-I is indeed a bad habit. But reterrialising as a speaking entity requires a site of enunciation. As a writer, it makes more sense for me to use 'we' (not in a universal sense) but as the site of enunciation of a collective assemblage addressing another 'we' (who might happen to organise as an I.) However re-teriorialising with this site of enunctiation is itself a resubjectification-where the subject is not given and is a multiple aggregate in transition. The aggregate is still subjected to the grammatical options available to him or her and as with Paul's comment, if some said we did not exist, the response would be well thats a shame! Further, multiple aggregates in transition still have potentials for molarity and for ossifying in to paranoic overcodes. It may be these are necessary to speak at all. However, it is not simply a case of schiz good paranoia bad-both impulses do different things when it comes to making sense from nonsense
> -a position that is
> not tenable for the sunyassin and which Nietzsche did not
> achieve. I am now out of the closet at having lived through
> several quite horrifying psychotic episodes in my own meditations
> on Eternal Return-it was a bit difficult to sat this while I was
> a doctoral student.
In psychosis, the Eternal Return can be quite scary, because there is no way out! Completely surrounded, and even no time to immerse in sleep...:-(
The only options are actual death or resubjectification/reterriorialiasation (even if this is madness). The time thing is different. Time off the rational calandar is still a durational register. The identification with advaiata desired in the Vedanta tradition fails in so far as no single aggregaate could become equal to the unequal of pure ordinality. However, the sense of not having a skin or means of differentiating self from cosmos can be experienced in psychosis and mystical experience. So more a question of inhabiting a time that feels like no time than no time as such.
> It is symbolic death (but not quite) for delusionary experience
> resymbolizes idiosyncratically at the 'edge'. I have been in
> these expereinces, a housefly, a spaceship and other transitory
> images of transcndence and immanence (images in which de and re
> subjectification play back and forth in precisely the zone of
> indetermination proposed). My point is desubjectification ain't
No, indeed, it isnt..
Would you like to say more?
> and returning from the dead ( as recommeded in WIP) much
> easier said than done. However, having done it and reassembled as
> something like a proviosional speaking subject, I would say that
> there is both something core that is esistentially personal but
> which by no means can be called an I and encounter which pushes
> the personal self past its sustainable threshold. In other words-
> Being is indeed experienced as a clamour in these states but
> nobody could live there for long. But going there does change
> subjectivity for better or worse...
mmm, that something core, isnt that just some continuity in the environment, instead of being personal (although, memory is involved, but perhaps not 'personal memory')
see the post to Paul-perhaps what is being negotiated is the concept of personhood that speaks of a personal self?
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