[D-G] 1949 Diss. on Spinoza and Vedanta

Wouter Kusters wku at ziggo.nl
Thu Jan 15 10:12:46 PST 2009

Hi Ruth,

> The reason I write is because I have been studying the lives of 
> Hindu sunyassin dedicated to experiential union with advaita 
> (literal meaning not two). The study was prompted by the 
> similarity of this understanding of nondual reality and themes in 
> Deleuze. The big difference is the manner of attaining what 
> amounts to a transpersonal consciousness-for the sunyassin, the 
> methods are chiefly yogic, contemplative and ascetic-while there 
> is violence in the process,the desired state is blissful 
> immersion and desubjectification v the violent process of 
> desubjectification described by Deleuze.
> As with yourself, I am more in favour of subjectivities for 
> better or worse these days. It should not be forgotten that 
> Deleuze also talks about resubjectification

Do you mean "reterritorialisation"? 

> -a position that is 
> not tenable for the sunyassin and which Nietzsche did not 
> achieve. I am now out of the closet at having lived through 
> several quite horrifying psychotic episodes in my own meditations 
> on Eternal Return-it was a bit difficult to sat this while I was 
> a doctoral student.

In psychosis, the Eternal Return can be quite scary, because there is no way out! Completely surrounded, and even no time to immerse in sleep...:-(

>  It is symbolic death (but not quite) for delusionary experience 
> resymbolizes idiosyncratically at the 'edge'. I have been in 
> these expereinces, a housefly, a spaceship and other transitory 
> images of transcndence and immanence (images in which de and re 
> subjectification play back and forth in precisely the zone of 
> indetermination proposed). My point is desubjectification ain't 
> funny 

No, indeed, it isnt..

> and returning from the dead ( as recommeded in WIP) much 
> easier said than done. However, having done it and reassembled as 
> something like a proviosional speaking subject, I would say that 
> there is both something core that is esistentially personal but 
> which by no means can be called an I and encounter which pushes 
> the personal self past its sustainable threshold. In other words- 
> Being is indeed experienced as a clamour in these states but 
> nobody could live there for long. But going there does change 
> subjectivity for better or worse...

mmm, that something core, isnt that just some continuity in the environment, instead of being personal (although, memory is involved, but perhaps not 'personal memory')


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