[D-G] internal, external teleology, immanence, transcendence
hwenk at web.de
Thu Aug 6 07:28:30 PDT 2009
There was a picture with the german journal
"stern" attached to one of your mails.
Again without any introduction or explanation.
I like to remark, that Spinoza differs from Aristotle
in the need of a "first" mover, where
the causa sui and restriction to effective cause is
one of HIS intellectual achievement.
Like the inifinty of neagtive integers,
going back in time in years to an infinte
number of years already passed by,
there is no "start" or "creation ex nihilo",
but there has been movement for eternity.
1) So, there is a double causation, point made by the already dead Hubbeling,
famous dutch Spinoza scholar,
of a double causalaty:
The causes from thing to thing, or modus to modus,
and the ontological "immanent" causa sui,
cause of essences, giving the essence
of a thing or modus.
2) So, there is a mechanical play of particels, atoms,
which produce as such like a gaz a homegenization like heat,
first tehorem of themodynamics.
But you get no at first sight no "essence" out of it,
no life, no selfconciousness,
even if you assume an attribute of thinking.
This puzzle of a stupid, deaf, blind,
mechanics and the high intelligence
even of animals has worried a lot of philosophers.
This question is stored in the vitalism discussion.,
where Bergson is very important.
The double causality in essences and movements
settles the question in a coarse direction way.
So, Spinoza is an essenceialist, in one mind with
the Aristotle bringer from the near east, Avincenna or Ibn Sina.
You get something like a graduation of being,
old scholastic and mediEVAL hierachical thinking,
or differences of being
regarding the essences.
Here, the species and arts of biology are the "essences",
double again as common notion and individual
anima or "subjcet(larves)". That is already present in Aristotle.
It is good to have in mind the coarse konwledge on
heredity and genes, although not totally absent.
As god or nature is the cause of the essence,
it cost real a lot of thinking
to grasp that making subjects and species, essences.
The picture of a
a potter forming clay is still present in Spinoza,
the forms are the forms we understand.
But, the forms are not necessary readymade there,
as platonic forms, the divine potter has
an ontological dynamic forming hand.
So, an ontological dymanic form for modis
is the best sight at hand for that forming indivuduals.
These forms can be reproduced and form again.
Important is to leave antrimorphism.
This going beyond platonism, solving
even the individual being
(with an individual soul) and being a member
of a species puzzle,
is ontolgical very dynamic.
In my eyes, the bottom up approach fom physics,
especially field theory and, atom theory and elementry particle physics
is almost ready, while the making essence part,
starting from the hereditiy and the mutation drifts
or rhizom, aparellel like mutations of the DNS and the building
of the noosphee, the sphere of notions out of
everyday experience of myridas of nerve cells,
only solved in a very formal, statistical way,
and by the ontolgy of stratas and expressions.
The existential worlf of becomings or subjectivations
is konwn a lot by miyriads of experience and examples.
These are stored in philosophies and techniques of non western culture too.
Thre are a lot of detailed causes left out.
Fortunately the unity of body-mind
and unconcious realizing
of brain structures shed some light on the
common notions, but there is still
a lot missing, especially concerning
more abstrct notions and real true intuitions and
The eternity of the soul or reincarnation is connected to
the classical "essence" causality.
So, the Kantian forms of reason or aesthetics
have somthing to do with the forming
of essences, in modern terms
with subjectivation, which is, as you saw,
present in Spinoza.
The konwledge of the waek and strong interaction
and teh geometry of atoms and molecules, which predetermine a lot
is also very imortant.
I think, the main feature is, that any possibilty of
a sophistcated regulation, with repetion and often very smal differences,
which can be brought to the klarge,
is used in a very creative and ingenious way in nature.
Therefore, somthing like a dynamic form on the level of engenieering
on every stratas is more adequte for grasping nature and ourselves, giving the
"desired" univocity of being.
I hope, that helps you more directly.
greetings Harald Wenk
Minmal surface are never spheres, the tend to be as plane as posssible
by the contour (Theorem of Bernstein).
You need a difference of inner and outer homogenous pressures, to produce
a sphere from a soap film or other material
obeying the minimals surface equation with this difference zero.
Minimal surface and H-surface theory has been tested in vacuum in
absece of gravity in NASA experiments in extraterristical space.
The stress forces in the material, material are due to a difference
waterphil and waterphob in soap films, they are modified or variated
or affected by the two pressures on
the two surface sides of the material.
CHANGE OF THEME TO PERSONAL QUESTION:
Were you present in Cologne at Massumis workshop?
Do you have in mind to visit the conference there?
greetings Harald Wenk
From: "filip" <fildh at gmx.net>
Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2009 12:57 AM
To: <deleuze-guattari at lists.driftline.org>
Subject: Re: [D-G] internal, external teleology, immanence, transcendence
>thank you so much for your reply.
>sorry for the non introduction, but i didn't wanna make the question
>i'm still looking at deleuze, been reading a few other things. (it's
>growing on me)
>Well let me state again my problem
>a)this is what hardt writes: "In many respects Deleuze reads Bergsonian
>ontology as a Scholasticism in which the discourse on causality is
>replaced with a discussion of difference".
>b)his discussion about difference is also looked at as : externality of
>difference. only the efficient cause is causa sui, can be seen as
>c)in his discussion it is not always clear how the externality is
>realised, he sometimes throws in elements of his discussion on
>representation, and doesn't stick to this treatment of deleuze and his
>opponents as an Scholasticism causality discourse.
>0)so the main question i have is : is external difference =
>next: if you follow hardt: he says: difference = motor of being
>i wanted to see what difference means for his opponents and what they
>see as the motor of being.
>so in steps (some are not threated explicitly by deleuze in his small
>papers, but are in difference and repitition, so i put them in the scheme)
>difference : property between things of the same genus, whereby you can
>put them in other subcategories
>motor of being : unmoved mover
>question: aristotles needs the unmoved move to give a final account of
>what is: so that makes his philosophy a philosophy of transcendence
>difference: difference as a closed mechanical structure : no newness is
>motor of being: since evertyhing is bounded up within a mechanical
>scheme: something must start this: could not find this.
>question : mechanism works via a plan, so can you consider this plan as
>not a question anymore: found this on the net : mechanism is using an
>external teleology: the purpuse to be realized is not immanent in the
>thing: it is presupposed by an agent or devine:
>difference : difference is not evolution of species but evolution of
>life. evolution of species
>motor of being : does not give a fundamental account on it.
>question : how does darwin see the true nature of live: immannent or
>difference: not defined by hardt or deleuze: i expect that difference is
>again a difference between things, (like aritstotles)
>motor of being : the motor is teleological : the good is external to life.
>difference: difference is going to an "infinte externality": thing
>differs with all the rest.
>motor of being : teleological development of the mind ?
>question: hegel is using an interal teleology = living organisms , but
>needs an external at the end = teleological model of the whole ? is this
>6) to answer your reply
>i made a mistake, i wrote: aristotles : him a transcendent philosopher?
>i wanted to say: a philosophy of transcendence.
>7)i'm not completely oke, with your sentence : In my eyes, Kant is to a
>a restricted version of Spinoza with emphasis on "subjectivty". your
>explanation didn't get through, it was a bit fast.
>but i'm intrigued by the powerful sentence. please elaborate a bit, it
>ps: i'm trying to make a flowchart of some thought of deleuze. if they
>are ready i'll try to post them on this forum.
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