[D-G] Jeepers, more Violence
dr.crawboney at gmail.com
Mon Sep 18 10:14:32 PDT 2006
> > to give the bible to
> > philological critics, as Spinoza had done by largely accepted historical
> > opinion,
> > is to destroy the believe in holy books in the middle in long run.
...that would be "one" way to look at it, but one can also see this
biblical pot-latch as a contrived means of binding science to the rock
of faith, just like Newton's gravity, which is born from apocrophal
inspriation (Re: parental narratives vs reason). In such a case we do
not escape these narratives. This is typical of
N's transvaluation of knowledge where the flipping between forward
and backwards flows can create impossible eddies of ethical delusion
for the person who is foolish enough to wade through the mire. As
works against philosophy. Even Deleuze's work on Spinoza maintains a strong
Nietzschian slant, precisely to show the reader how vulnerable Spinoza
is to his dangerous philology. If we wonder where subversion comes
from, we see it in un-intended interpretation. This opens up a vast
realm of ignorance, something which locke wishes to fill, but it is N
with his false language of "types."
> > So not settling the question of parapsyhology has become part of the
> > shiboleth regarding holy books and foreign cultures itself.
> > That is even political very intersting, as the struggle on ideas
> > is thrown back totally to the religious sphere - with christianism on the
> > western side.
> > But this has not been the case for science in the start at the times of
> > Spinoza.
there is a faint line to trace between spinoza and trinidad, but a
common point of intersection would be granada, 1492, no? Furthermore,
I think looking at concepts of property/territory in those days would
reveal much of that faint tracing which has been covered over by that
transvaluation process which is psychically imprinted on modern
western notion of territory... and territory still manages to be "the"
topic of the day even if it hides behind religion.
So what I was talking about before was the territory of languages, and
now I have brought up Spinoza, and I must say that linking "identity to
reason", as Spinoza has done, has had a profound impact on the rapid
extinction of languages among the "un-reasonable". Am I clarifying
this idea of "ethics of ignorance" at all for you? Can you see how the
deligation of "what is reasonable" merely maintains the same
power structures for the masters' own shibboleth, but at once it expedites
their control of the slaves in terms of their social identity (Re:
lockes' tabla rasa). To me it acts as divine-violence, or like one
that is like divine but stems from the creation of a mega-machine
which treats civilians as parts of that machine. The slaves remain
ignorant because of a particular shibboleth(as you say) they cannot
percieve the legal contracts imposed upon them, unless, of course they
convert (Re:going from 2-to-3) which is a negatio of spinoza's
imaginary reason and a return to simple oedipal narratives. So I
really dont see the point of this line other then its rhetorical
value, but again, the rhetoric is lost inside the broadcast system of
> > Western scientific community makes culturasl studies, trying to be something
> > like neutral.
> > But there is nor real scientific explanation on the ground of the neutrality
> > but implicitly refusing for example parapsycholgy
> > and making normal neurology out of mysticism. At least the last point is
> > strongly tried.
I don't get where you are going with parapsychology, but I suppose any
un-named flow, whether its real or not or merely illegal, becomes
flattened by the philology of a shibboleth. Once they are flattened
then it is extremely difficult to untangle truely illegal flows from
those generations of imaginary virtuals that work to compound
ignorance. So it allows aristotle to imagine an "equatorial
slovenliness" or for us some strangeness like "the equatorial love
for children." But this is an imaginary territory and any effort to
de-territorialize it is a detentional ambition because it does nothing
to address the actual territorialized plane which I only see as
relating to identity and property, and this makes perfect sense for me
so I can't understand why this line wouldn't be followed.
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